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  Central bank independence is widely thought be a sine qua non of a credible 
commitment to price stability.  The surprise decision by the UK government to 
grant operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997 affords us a 
natural experiment with which to gauge the impact on the yield curve from the 
adoption of central bank independence.  We document the extent to which the 
decision to grant independence was ‘news’ and illustrate that the reduction in 
medium and long term nominal interest rates was some 50 basis points, which 
we show to be consistent with a sharp increase in policymaker’s aversion to 
inflation deviations from target. We suggest therefore central bank 
independence represents one of the clearest signals available to elected 
politicians about their preferences on the control of inflation.   
 
JEL Classification: E4; E5; N2. 
Keywords: Central bank independence, preferences, yield curve. 
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There has been an enormous and influential research effort over the past two decades 
devoted to understanding the case for the adoption of central bank independence.  Much 
of this research has passed into received economic wisdom about the appropriate 
formulation of monetary policy.  Following Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977) 
and the subsequent work by Robert Barro and David Gordon (1983), it became clear that 
the absence of a credible commitment by the monetary authorities to price stability would 
induce a positive (and costly) bias to equilibrium inflation outcomes.
1  An independent 
central bank with a credible commitment to price stability was widely thought to be the 
way to establish such credibility.  This key debate was particularly instrumental in the 
UK.  It provided the stimulus for a series of reforms to the monetary constitution of the 
UK in the 1990s, following exit from the ERM in 1992, and culminated with the granting 
of operational independence for the Bank of England in 1997.   
 
Despite overwhelming theoretical evidence, the empirical evidence of the impact of 
operational central bank independence has been limited, offering at best qualified support 
for the benefits of such a framework.
2  We are fortunate therefore that the incoming 
Labour government in the UK in 1997 decided to make a surprise announcement about 
the creation of operational independence for the Bank of England on its fifth day of 
office.  Although a decision to reform some aspects of the monetary constitution was 
expected, the crucial and final step of operational independence for the Bank of England 
was a complete surprise to the financial markets on the morning of May 6 1997.  We 
should further note that the announcement did neither entail any reduction in the central 
target for inflation nor any change in the measure of inflation.  It involved a number of 
                                                           
1   The literature is too large to do justice to in a short note such as this and we suggest the reader follows 
the debate in Carl Walsh (1998). 
2   The touchstone for this literature was Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summer’s (1993) finding of a 
negative association between the extent of central bank independence and low inflation but of no 
significant relationship with output growth.    3
procedural changes, which we outline below, with the main force of the policy initiative 
being that of operational independence.
3  Ben Bernanke (2003) has recently argued that 
“(t)he maintenance of price stability -- and equally important, the development by the 
central bank of a strong reputation for and commitment to it - …serves to anchor the 
private sector's expectations of future inflation” and it is this impact of the announcement 
that we wish to assess. 
 
In this paper, we are able to evaluate the implications, in terms of nominal interest rates, 
from the announcement of central bank independence per se.  Section 1 outlines the key 
result from a recent paper by Tore Ellingsen and Ulf Söderström (2001) which gives us 
the framework for examining the UK’s natural experiment with a model that builds a 
term structure of interest rates into Lars Svensson’s (1997) widely used model of 
aggregate supply and demand.  Section 2 outlines the available documentary evidence on 
the decision to grant operational independence in May 1997, and shows that the decision 
was a surprise and thus the change in interest rates on the trading day represent a measure 
of the implications resulting from the adoption of credible central bank independence.  
Section 3 presents the response of the market in terms of the yields on UK government 
bonds, where we find clear evidence that the nominal yields fell dramatically on the 
announcement of central bank independence.  Section 4 infers the move in central bank 
preferences in favour of inflation stabilization that would be consistent with the 
predictions of the Svensson-Ellingsen-Söderström model and finds a close match with the 
actual shift in longer tem interest rates observed on the Bank of England’s ‘Independence 
Day’.  Section 5 offers a short conclusion.
                                                           
3   Short term policy rates were also raised by 25Bp on ‘Independence Day’ but this move was widely 
expected and led to little or no movement in the short end of the yield curve see Figure 2.  For example, 
April 1997 Goldman Sachs UK Economics Analyst reported that “we expect a base rate rise of at least 25 
basis points at the May 7 monetary meeting” and Paribas Economic Research produced a forecast, April 7   4
I.  Modeling the Yield Curve 
 
How should the term structure of interest rates respond to monetary policy news?   
Specifically, how should the financial markets treat the decision by a government to 
adopt operational independence for a central bank in pursuit of a stated monetary 
objective?  In a recent contribution Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) note that the 
literature has offered competing answers to that question.  Some have argued that the 
yield curve ought to respond symmetrically, with long term interest rates moving in the 
same direction as short term interest rates.  Others contend that long rates ought to 
respond in the opposite direction to short rates.  
 
Ellingsen and Söderström reconcile these views arguing that what is key is whether the 
‘shock’ driving the change in monetary policy is to the structural relations of the 
economy or whether shocks to the preferences of the monetary policymaker have 
occurred.  Clearly, we can treat the move to operational independence as a clear signal 
that the preferences of the monetary policy maker had shifted decisively against inflation 
and should mutatis mutandis have clear implications for the rest of the yield curve. They 
adopt an influential model developed by Lars Svensson (1997, 1999)
4, in which shocks to 
inflation and output are persistent, and in which monetary policy operates with a lag.  
Policy authorities assess economic outcomes, and formulate policy plans, with reference 
to a quadratic criterion in output and inflation.  
 
Broadly speaking, they show that if monetary policy changes are well understood by the 
private sector then both ends of the yield curve will move in the same direction.  So, for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1997, in which not only base rates were expected to rise 25Bp immediately after the election but also where 
the term structure of interest rates, as a result, shifted upwards by 25-50Bp. 
4   Laurence Ball (1999) also presents a similar model.   5
instance, following a tightening of the monetary stance the rise in the yield curve at the 
short end will be mirrored by a rise at the long end (and at all points in between).  In the 
case of an inflation averse central bank the change at the short end is likely to be greater 
than the change at the long end.  This same pattern of symmetric responses at the short 
and long end is also present when the central bank has private information on the shocks 
hitting the economy.  In this case a rise in short rates informs agents about the future path 
of monetary policy.  
 
However the presence of asymmetric information vis a vis the preferences of the central 
bank may lead to an asymmetric response at opposite ends of the curve.  A tightening of 
monetary policy may reveal information about the preferences of the policymaker.  If this 
is a perceived permanent change to inflation aversion then the policymaker will enact a 
relatively sharp tightening in the monetary stance in the short run, enabling interest rates 
to return to base more quickly and consequently long rates actually fall.  In this case, it 
was not the tightening per se that indicated a change in preferences but an explicit 
announcement that the operation of policy would be undertaken by an independent 
central bank. 
 
As Ellingsen and Söderström argue, testing the predictions of their model is not 
straightforward as "it is necessary to classify changes in monetary policy according to 
whether they reflect unanticipated changes in policy preferences or in economic 
developments" (p. 1603).  However, on May 6 1997, shortly after the new Labour 
Government took office, the Bank of England was granted operational independence with 
respect to monetary policy.  What is more, as we document more fully below, this policy 
initiative took commentators by surprise.  We go on to argue therefore that the UK data   6
appear to be an important place to test the second prediction of the Svensson-Ellingsen-
Söderström (SES) model. 
 
 
II.  The Decision to Grant Independence 
 
Following exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism on September 16 1992, the 
UK monetary authorities had adopted a target for inflation of 1-4% in October 1992 for 
the Parliament of 1992-7.  The inflation rate was to be measured by the Retail Price Index 
excluding mortgage interest payments, so-called RPIX.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
pursued this inflation target in conjunction with advice offered by the Governor (and 
other senior officials) of the Bank of England at a monthly meeting.  This new post-1992 
regime was accompanied by initiating the publication of an Inflation Report and minutes 
of monthly Governor-Chancellor meetings.  The central expectation for the markets 
following the election of a Labour government on May 1 1997 was that this system of 
Central Bank advice and Treasury action would continue unchanged.
5 
 
But on May 6 1997, a mere four days after taking office, the incoming Labour 
government, with its first policy initiative, announced that the Bank of England would be 
granted operational independence for monetary policy.  Furthermore they charged a 
newly created Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) with meeting the same central 
inflation target.  In his letter to the Governor, Chancellor Brown writes: “[o]perational 
decisions on interest rate policy will be made by a new Monetary Policy Committee 
                                                           
5   To be clear, it was the announcement of central bank independence (CBI) on that day which was a 
surprise. For example, a previous Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, had made calls for formal independence and 
under the Maastricht Treaty the terms of joining any future European Monetary Union would involve CBI.  
There was much widespread opinion in the UK of the need for CBI, see, for example, Roll (1993) but 
adoption of CBI was not expected immediately after the election.   7
comprising the Governor, the Deputy Governors and six members”.  Additionally, the 
government adopted an explicit and symmetric target for RPIX inflation of 2.5%, from 
which any deviation of 1% would require an open letter of explanation from the 
Governor to the Chancellor.  We stress that there was no downward shift in the central 
inflation target to be pursued by the monetary authorities.
6 
 
The decision to grant independence on that day was a surprise to the markets, HM 
Treasury, and to the Bank of England itself.  In fact, the Chancellor’s decision to grant 
operational independence was only openly discussed with incoming Prime Minister Blair 
on polling day itself, May 1 1997.
7  The Labour Party’s Business Manifesto published on 
April 11 1997 had proposed the following reform to the Bank of England, which falls 
well short of operational independence: 
 
“We propose a new monetary policy committee to decide on the advice which the Bank 
of England should give to the Chancellor.”
8   
 
In the week following the announcement, the Economist Newspaper actually complained 
that the reform was not signaled in the Labour Party manifesto and was not debated or 
discussed as a serious policy initiative.
9  This decision “surprised everybody, including 
the Bank of England and the Treasury”.
10  Certainly, in subsequent interviews the 
officials at the Bank of England have admitted both market and personal surprise at the 
announcement.  Howard Davies (2000), then Deputy Governor at the Bank of England, 
                                                           
6 This is crucial as otherwise falling nominal bond yields could be attributed to falling (long run) inflation 
expectations via the Fisher effect. 
7   Andrew Rawnsley (2000), a widely respected political commentator in the UK, uses private interviews 
to establish this element of the surprise, page 3 and 31.  Note that May 5 1997 was a ‘Bank’ Holiday 
Monday and so the decision was delayed to the Tuesday by this Public Holiday. 
8   Quoted by Denzil Davies (Labour) M.P. in Hansard on November 11 1997, Column 737.   
9   Economist, May 10 1997, page 13.   8
admitted in an interview that the announcement was “[t]o the market’s surprise”.  
Governor Sir Eddie George also admitted in an interview that he was not expecting 
immediate operational independence and drew a link to the likely impact on longer-term 
interest rates:  
 
“…I was very surprised by the timing – the decision to move [on independence] 
immediately on taking office…the markets believed that the politicians would not let go 
of the decisions on implementation of monetary policy.  And this was damaging.  It 
meant that inflation expectations did not adjust to the extent that they might have done to 
the decline in actual inflation.  The impact on expectations is shown by the fact that bond 




To sum up, the decision to grant operational independence to the Bank of England was 
not incorporated in central market expectations of interest rates at the close of business 
trading on May 2 1997 and we can therefore treat the close of business trading prices of 
those interest rates on May 6 1997 as indicating the impact of central bank independence.   
 
III.  Market Interest Rates 
 
In this section we examine three sets of market interest rates and their responses to the 
news of Independence on May 6 1997.  Figure 1 shows the response of the three-month 
sterling interest rate futures at quarterly intervals until the longest dated contract at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10   William Keegan (2001) The Observer, June 17 2001. 
11   Central Banking Publications Limited, March 25 2002, page 22.   9
twenty-two months out.  Figures 2 and 3 depict the response of the forward government 
yield curve, at horizons up to five years and then out to twenty-five years.
12   
 
Table 1 simply picks a small number of the representative nominal rates and quantifies 
the magnitude of the interest rate response.  At longer term horizons we note a substantial 
response, measured either from the previous trading day on May 2 1997 or from two days 
previously on May 1 1997.  The response of 10-year instantaneous forwards is 
illustrative.  The basis point change from the closing date of the election or from the 
closing date of the new government’s first day in office, suggests a fall in yields of some 
50-60 basis points: that represented a shock in the region of several standard deviations of 
the typical daily change. 
 
Short sterling contracts are market forecasts of a short-term interest rate closely related to 
the policy rate.
13  We note that the response of expected rates increases with horizon.  
This is consistent with the view that inflation from at least one year out is most likely to 
be affected by current monetary policy.  Up to that horizon inflation is in some measure 
pre-determined and hence monetary policy responses should not be as sensitive to the 
change in preferences that central bank independence entails.  This hypothesis is 
corroborated by the rate response of short-term interest rates.  As we examine longer term 
interest rates, where preferences are increasingly likely to impact on interest rates, we 
find in each a significant decrease in interest rates.  The value of central bank 
independence looks clear – it can significantly reduce medium and long nominal rates for 
both government and private sector liabilities.   
 
                                                           
12   Note as May 2 1997 was a Friday and the following Monday was a Public Holiday, May 6 1997 was the 
next trading day.  The corporate sector’s commercial rates followed a very similar pattern and are available 
on request.   10
IV.  The Implications of Independence Day 
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where  t π is the deviation at time t of the inflation rate from its long run equilibrium level, 
t y  is the percentage deviation in real output from equilibrium,  t i  is the deviation of the 
nominal short (policy) interest rate from its long-run equilibrium level  and  t ε  and   t η are 
both identically and independently distributed shocks.  Equation (1) is a simple aggregate 
supply relationship employing an accelerationist Phillips curve, where the change in 
inflation is a function of the previous period’s deviation in output and an aggregate 
supply shock.  The aggregate demand relationship, equation (2), represents the deviation 
in output as a function of its own lag and (the deviation in) the ex-post real interest rate 
and a demand shock.  At each point in time it is assumed the monetary authority selects 
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where δ  is a constant discount factor and λ , the monetary authority’s preference 
parameter, is the weight placed upon output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization 
in a standard period loss function, 
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The bank is assumed to minimize its loss function subject to a constraint found by taking 
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We exploit the trade off in the loss function and posit that the optimal expected output 
gap is negatively related the expected deviation in inflation two periods ahead, 
t t t t k y | 2 | 1            (9) + + − = π  
We shall solve for k in a moment
15. Substituting for the expected output gap in equation 
(7), using equation (8) and putting the resulting expression into equation (6) yields, 
t t t t
k









If we then lead equations (7), (8) and (9) forward one period, then a small amount of 
algebra yields, 
t t t t k
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14  Svensson (1997, 1999) and Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) make use of  dynamic programming to 
uncover the optimality conditions. 
15  Note that this is analogous to the ‘guess and verify’ approach to finding the value function. See 
Svensson (1997, 1999) and Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) for further details.   12
Equation (11) may then be substituted into equation (10) in order to derive the following 
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We then substitute equation (9) into equation (2) and take expectations of the resulting 
expression to get, 
  t t t t t
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and then put equations (1) and (2) into equation (9). Taking expectations of the resulting 
expression results in, 
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That is, the optimal rule used by the central bank may be represented by an optimal 
Taylor rule. 
  Leading the optimal Taylor rule (6) and taking expectations gives 
t s t t t s t t t s t y B A i | | | ) 1 (            ) 12 ( + + + + + = π  
That is the expected forward rate is simply the expected Taylor rule at each point in the 
future. Ellingsen and Söderström then show that by leading and taking expectations of 
equations (1) and (2) and using them in equation (12) it is possible to write the expected 
forward rate (under certainty equivalence) as:  
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where  t s t i | + is the expected interest rate s periods ahead, and At and  Bt are functions of the 
parameters of equations (1), (2), (3) and (4).
16 
  Our estimation strategy is to generate the yield curve pre and post-Independence 
Day using equation (5), which most closely replicates the observed change in nominal 
rates outlined in Section 3 and infer the implied change in preferences, λ .  The first step 
is to estimate the set of parameter values (      ,   , γ β α ) as well as obtain values for the 
inflation and output shocks at the time.  Armed with estimates of the structural model 
from equations (1) and (2), we then calculate a value for the policy preference 
parameter,λ  both before and after operational independence that minimizes the 
difference between the change in the forward yield curve predicted by our model and the 
change in the forward yield curve observed in the real world data.
17 
  We obtain parameter values      and   ,   , γ β α by estimating equations (1) and (2) using 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML).  Our estimates were made on data of both 
annual and quarterly frequency, for a number of different samples and making use of a 
number of different definitions of the variables included in equations (1) and (2).
18  The 
                                                           
16   See Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) for a fuller derivation of this result.  
17   Related work includes Cecchetti et al, (2002), who make use of an SVAR model to generate an optimal 
interest rate series that minimizes a standard loss function. This series is then use to extract an estimate of 
the policy preference parameter for a number of European economies. Robertson and Symons (1994, 1997) 
make use of government index linked debt to extract an estimate of the ex-ante real short interest rate and 
examine how it is influenced by changes in UK monetary policy.  
18   More specifically our FIML estimates are calculated using annual data covering the period from 1950 to 
1996, and quarterly data covering the periods 1980:1 to 1997:1 and from 1993:1 to 1997:1.  Our output 
variable is the percentage difference between actual real GDP and potential real GDP where potential real 
GDP is calculated by fitting a quadratic trend through the appropriate sample of data.  For sub-samples 
based on 1993:1 to 1997:1, potential GDP is calculated using 1980:1 to 1997:1 sample.  We also 
experimented with percentage growth as the output variable.  We assume equilibrium inflation to be the 
then Bank of England target rate of 2.5% and the equilibrium nominal short interest rate to be the 
appropriate sample mean.  In other specifications we experimented by allowing equilibrium inflation to be 
a centred five year moving average of actual inflation and the equilibrium nominal short interest rate to be 
equal to this value plus a constant term, where the constant is from a regression of the nominal interest rate 
on the inflation rate over the appropriate sample period. Inflation is measured as the (annualized) change in 
the RPIX (from 1976 onwards) and the RPI (before 1976).  Our interest rate variable is the appropriate 
monetary policy instrument (base rate), which was the Bank Rate until October 1972, the Minimum 
Lending Rate from October 1972 until March 1981, the Minimum Band 1 Lending Rate thereafter until 
March 1997 and the two week Repo Rate since.  Since the regression equations are in ‘quasi’ – deviation   14
upper panel of Table 2 presents the estimated parameter values.  We also assume that 
both inflation and output were both expected to be above target in the absence of policy 
action.
19   
  In order to illustrate this methodology we will initially select the parameter values 
of  1 . 0 = α
20,  0 . 1   , 1 . 0 = = γ β
21 and  04 . 1 / 1 = δ , with the supplementary assumption that 
the economy faced an inflation and output overshoot of 1.0%.  We may then select values 
of the Bank of England’s preference parameter for output over inflation stabilization both 
before ( 1 λ ) and after ( 2 λ ) operational independence.  We calculate a nominal forward 
rate curve before and after operational independence and compare this generated change 
with the observed change in the nominal forward rate curve.  Values for  1 λ  and  2 λ  are 
chosen by minimizing the root mean squared error (RMSE) statistic for the difference in 
the change between the two sets of curves.  
  For this particular combination of parameters and deviations on ‘Independence 
Day’, the RMSE is minimized when  3 . 10 1 = λ  and   6 . 0 2 = λ  (see Figure 4).  This implies 
a large proportionate fall in λ  when the Bank of England was granted operational 
independence, and is consistent with the predictions of the SES model. The observed fall 
in yields is consistent with a surprise fall in the policy preference parameter, which in 
turn causes the expected future interest rate to fall, as markets expect inflation to return to 
equilibrium more quickly. This finding is robust for any reasonable value of the Phillips 
curve slope, α . Figure 5 plots the change in λ (as a percentage of its initial value) against 
α , and suggests the magnitude of the change decreases in α .  Note also, we find that as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
form, we also included a constant term in some specifications.  Further details of the estimates are available 
on request.   
19   The 1997 IMF Article IV pointed to the main risk in the UK economy was that ‘too-rapid growth based 
on the momentum of domestic demand could rekindle inflation’ see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1997/pn9734.htm 
20   This value corresponds to that found by Glenn D Rudebusch and Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999, and is 
close in spirit to the micro-founded value used by Julio J. Rotemberg and Michael Woodford, 1997.  
21   These values are suggested by Laurence Ball, 1999 for a small open economy.   15
the value of α rises (after a minimum of 0.04), so does the value of the RMSE statistic 
(see Figure 6) and we find that the log likelihood is also maximized when α  implies a 
relatively inelastic inflation response to output and so we best explain the observed shift 
in the yield curve with a relatively inelastic Phillips curve slope.  The intuition follows 
from the impact of a demand shock (Equation 2), which will lead to changes in both the 
output and inflation deviation variables in the same direction.  The monetary authority’s 
response, in terms of interest rates, will have a weaker impact on expected future inflation 
(Equation 1) the lower is α  (the flatter is the Phillips curve).  Thus expected future short 
rates will mean revert relatively less quickly causing the difference in the simulated 
forward rate curves, before and after operational independence, to diminish less quickly 
and resemble more the real world data, and hence improve the fit of the SES model.   
  The upper panel of Table 2 presents our parameter estimates and the lower panel 
the results of using these estimates to calculate the implied change in central bank 
preferences.  From these estimates we infer  1 λ  and  2 λ , which generate the closest fit to 
the observed shift in the yield curve on Independence Day.  We therefore apply the 
parameter values to our simulations.  For each model and set of parameters we find clear 
evidence that  2 1 λ λ >  (i.e., that  0 / 1 < Δ λ λ ) so that the shift in the yield curve was 
consistent with a sharp perceived fall in the relative weight the monetary authorities 
placed on inflation relative to output following the announcement of central bank 
independence.  In effect, we find that, providing our parameter estimates are acceptable 
and that the UK economy needed higher interest rates in order to stabilize output and 
inflation, the substantial shift downwards in the interest rates associated with longer term 
liabilities can be attributed to a sharp fall in the extent to which the monetary authorities 
valued output deviations from equilibrium as opposed to inflation deviations from target. 
 
   16
V.  Conclusion 
 
  The arguments for central bank independence represent a key contribution of 
economic science to the formulation of monetary policy.  Ellingsen and Söderström 
(2001) provide us with a framework for understanding why the audacious stroke of the 
UK’s new government in 1997 so profoundly affected nominal interest rates.  Our results 
suggest the granting of operational independence for the Bank of England allowed 
policymakers to signal, in the clearest form available to them, that there was a significant 
increase in the policy losses associated with inflation instability.  The empirical evidence 
for the benefits of central bank independence is thus clarified: long-term interest rates 
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TABLE 1 RESPONSE OF MARKET INTEREST RATES TO INDEPENDENCE DAY. 
 






September 1997  -6 B.p.  -5 B.p.  6 B.p. 
June 1998  -14 B.p.  -9 B.p.  6 B.p. 
December 1998  -20 B.p.  -17 B.p.  6 B.p. 
5 year nominal forward  -34 B.p.  - 34 B.p.  7 B.p. 
10 year nominal forward  -51 B.p.  -62 B.p.  7 B.p. 
15 year nominal forward  -59 B.p.  -62 B.p.  7 B.p. 
20 year nominal forward  -59 B.p.  -49 B.p.  7 B.p. 
5 year benchmark: 
7% 2002 
 
- 18 B.p. 
 
- 22 B.p. 
 
6 B.p. 
10 year benchmark: 








Notes: We show the change on implied interest rates three-month sterling futures, the fitted forward curve 
and on benchmark bond redemption yields on one-trading day i.e. either side of the decision on 
independence and the two-day change, which includes the first day of trading following the election of the 
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TABLE 2  P ARAMETER ESTIMATES. 
 
 Model    
 a  b  c 
α  0.24 0.28 0.29 
β  0.61 0.67 0.60 
γ  0.14 0.05 0.05 
Frequency quarterly  annual  quarterly 
Sample  93:1 – 97:1  50 - 96  80:1 – 97:1 
ML   -5.86  -209.36  -291.56 
2
1 R   0.22 0.61 0.48 
2
2 R   0.80 0.17 0.35 
DW1  1.04 1.92 0.42 
DW2  1.04 1.97 0.28 
1 λ   8.5 6.1 4.8 
2 λ   1.0 1.7 1.6 
1 /λ λ Δ   -0.88 -0.72 -0.67 
RMSE  17.01 16.47 21.67 
 
Notes: The parameters were estimated by FIML, using annual and quarterly data.  Models a-c are estimates 
of the Equations (1) and (2) from the text.  We assume equilibrium inflation is the target rate of 2.5 percent 
and that the equilibrium level of the nominal short interest rate is the relevant sample mean.  In the 
quarterly models output is measured as a deviation from potential output and in c output is measured as 
percentage growth.  Summary statistics of the regressions are also presented: ML represents the maximized 
likelihood value, 
2
1 R  and DW1 and  
2
2 R  and DW2 are the adjusted 
2 R  and Durbin-Watson statistics from 
estimation of Equations (1) and (2) respectively.  1 λ  and  2 λ  are the weights placed upon output 
stabilization relative to inflation stabilization by the monetary authorities before and after operational 
independence.  For given output and inflation innovations, values for  1 λ ,  2 λ , and  1 /λ λ Δ  are found by 
minimizing the difference, as measured by Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) statistic, in basis points, 
between the change in the actual nominal forward yield curve and that predicted by the model.  We assume 
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Notes:  We assume  04 . 1 / 1 , 0 . 1 , 9 . 0 , 1 . 0 = = = = δ γ β α and the inflation and output innovations are 
equal to 1.0 percent. This results in a minimized RMSE of 1.63 basis points, 3 . 10 1 = λ , 6 . 0 2 = λ  and a 
proportionate fall inλ of  0.94. The change in the forward rate is measured in basis points.   
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Notes: We assume  04 . 1 / 1 , 0 . 1 , 9 . 0 = = = δ γ β and the inflation and output innovations are equal to 
1.0 percent. The diagram suggests a negative relationship between the slope of the Phillips curve and the 





   26
 
 
















Notes: We assume  04 . 1 / 1 , 0 . 1 , 9 . 0 = = = δ γ β and the inflation and output innovations are equal to 
1.0 percent. The diagram suggests the RMSE (measured in basis points) of the best fitting SES model 
increases with the slope of the Phillips curve. 
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Notes: The maximized likelihood value is found from model a in Table 2 above. We allow α to vary, but 
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